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Paul Freedman
Medieval law was an accretion of traditions from several sources. This
is well known, for example, with regard to the historical development of
English Common Law. Continental and church law of the Middle Ages
was built on a foundation of Roman or Roman-inspired codes and prac-
tices and so tended to emphasize statute and authoritative executive state-
ments more than did customary laws. In both its political government and
legislation the medieval church was increasingly centralized. Nevertheless,
even the church faced the task of reconciling diverse norms and precedents
(Biblical, Patristic, Roman, Germanic) that reflected conflicting proce-
dures and social expectations. One might expect medieval canon law relat-
ing to sexual behavior to have been straightforward and unyielding, but
this is not the case. Because of the interaction of ethical and textual tradi-
tions, and the nature of medieval society (which was rather more exuber-
ant than is commonly believed), the development of ecclesiastical regula-
tion was slow and complex.
The Middle Ages was hardly unique in attempting to control the mani-
festations of sexual desire. All societies have both informal expectations
and formal rules about sex and marriage. Where they differ, often radi-
cally, is in marking off aspects of sexual and domestic relations considered
private and thus left to individual conscience or preference from those sub-
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ject to legal enforcement. Lawmakers of the Middle Ages were surely
more willing than those of modern Western societies to control marriage
and sexual behavior, but as recent experience shows, the desire for regula-
tion and its targets can change suddenly. Contemporary shifts in outlook
and law with regard to abortion, or toward physical abuse of women by
their husbands, demonstrate the changes possible in mapping the bounda-
ries of social conformity.
The first part of Law, Sex, and Christian Society by James Brundage
looks at the Greek, Roman, Biblical, and Germanic precepts that consti-
tuted the bequest of the ancient world to the Middle Ages. The center of
attention in this book, however, is the period after 1000 and before the
Reformation when church law was systematically codified and elaborated.
Brundage tends to subsume the entire period under a rubric of sexual
repressiveness, but his detailed survey of legal opinion shows that, despite
an overall mistrust and depreciation of sexuality, there was no monolithic
teaching even about such major issues as the sanctity of marriage, the
celibacy of the clergy, or what sexual acts outside of marriage might be
considered sinful.
During these centuries, through an increasingly structured legal order,
some coherence was achieved in defining licit and illicit sexual alliances.
Yet, despite prolific discussion among generations of highly trained jurists,
fundamental questions were only slowly, if ever, resolved: What consti-
tuted a binding marriage? How should concubinage be defined and did it
constitute a legally recognized relationship? How sinful was sexual pleas-
ure per se?
What makes the Middle Ages unusual in its approach to sexual rela-
tions is not that its intellectual classes regarded sex with disdain or fear.
Polities such as Calvin's Geneva or revolutionary China would also at-
tempt radical reforms of sexual conduct. What particularly characterizes
the medieval era, and what justifies an intensive disquisition on the canon
law of the eleventh through fifteenth centuries, is the international en-
forcement apparatus established by the church at that time. A degree of
legal and moral control was exerted across secular boundaries by an insti-
tution with little direct political authority. This was not merely a pastoral
effort, although it is often impossible for an observer to separate canon
law precisely from the rules governing the hearing of confessions. The
ecclesiastical law had a more than admonitory power and the archives of
Europe preserve innumerable records of church tribunals whose primary
order of business was marriage litigation.
The jurisdiction of the church in sexual and marital cases was univer-
sally, if somewhat grudgingly, recognized by secular authorities. In cases
involving violence (such as abduction or rape) or money (marital presta-
tions, notably dowry), kings and municipalities might claim to resolve dis-
putes, but the church exerted a considerable amount of power in defining
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and supervising morality through legal scholarship and institutions. Nev-
ertheless, the very power held by ecclesiastical authorities led to an inter-
nal conflict among social expectations, moral teachings, and the regulation
of society. The scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction meant that law and en-
forcement came up against the practices and attitudes of families, classes,
and governments.
The effort at ordering and controlling was immense, and to describe its
history is not an easy task, requiring as it does massive learning and pa-
tient sifting of texts. It should be emphasized that Brundage has per-
formed an enormous service in revealing the complex theories of genera-
tions of lawyers whose works had a palpable influence on the course of
human lives. He quite understandably concentrates his attention and con-
siderable skill on the critical period 1140-1234, from the Decretum of
Gratian to the promulgation of the first official collection of papal letters
having the force of legal rulings, the Decretales issued by Pope Gregory
IX. This "classic age" of canon law saw the appearance not only of these
authoritative texts, but also the proliferation of academic commentary and
debate originating from problems posed by their interpretation. Little of
the energetic legal activity has ever been printed, and this makes the study
of canon law exceptionally difficult. To find out what even a single canon-
ist such as Huguccio considered problematic in analyzing fornication, big-
amy, or adultery requires knowledge of the extensive manuscript sources
in order to pick a path through the inevitable inconsistencies of non-uni-
form manuscript production to find the correct text. Brundage's effort in
assembling his authorities is so great that it is not surprising that the
project has taken twenty years to complete.
The resulting work is something more in the nature of a handbook than
a sustained discussion. Chapters proceed chronologically and are then di-
vided by subject. One therefore encounters the teachings of the early
decretists (those who commented on Gratian) arranged around marital
sex, dissolution of marriage, concubinage, non-marital sex, and procedure,
with most of these sections further subdivided. Subsequent chapters on the
early decretal collections and commentaries are similarly organized.'
Reading the book for the first time, it will be difficult to follow the story
of each sexual offense or marital question from one generation of scholar-
ship to the next. Once familiar with the architecture of the work, how-
ever, it is possible to exploit its complexity.
To the extent that there is an interpretive scheme to this book, its force
does not match the erudition assembled from the sources of law. In catego-
rizing the large body of information he has assembled, Brundage deline-
1. Thus in order to discern, for example, the changes in canonistic understanding of impotence in
dissolving marriages one has to look at pp. 201-202, 290-292, 322, 339, 376-378, 413, 456-458, and
512 for the years 1000 to 1348.
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ates three models of learned opinion concerning sexuality: an emphasis on
the impurity of sexual desire which marriage channels in less harmful
directions, a belief that reproduction confers a moral justification on the
sexual act, thus elevating marriage to a place of moderate esteem, and an
approval of intimacy whereby marriage becomes the preferred mode of
life and a larger sphere of conjugal privacy is accepted. Brundage consid-
ers the first view typical of the late antique or early Christian period,
while ascribing the growth of justification by procreation to the high Mid-
dle Ages. The third view, that of recognizing what has been called the
"companionate marriage," has been a minority point of view in the Cath-
olic tradition until recently.
Brundage considers the first overarching approach to be the foundation
upon which all subsequent laws were built. According to Brundage, a
fundamental Christian mistrust of concupiscence generated a consistent at-
tempt to restrain and direct it. He dutifully avoids the facile assertion that
the coming of Christianity blighted a happy pagan sensuality by allotting
part of the blame to Stoicism, but holds the church, from the time of Paul
until the present, responsible for a persistent denial of human "sexual
expression" and needless condemnation of life-affirming intimacy.
There is no denying the evidence supporting a well-established Chris-
tian habit of regarding the flesh as obstinate but controllable, an outlook
that did not hesitate to prescribe conduct in what are now considered mat-
ters of individual choice. Was this because a wrong turn was taken some-
where, because those who framed the issues were dour and warped? To
make this assumption would be to oversimplify an earlier age and to posit
a modern consensus that does not in fact exist. The twenty-year period in
which Law, Sex, and Christian Society took shape has also witnessed up-
heaval in how we view the construction of sexual mores and social iden-
tity. Brundage at times appears like a visitor from another age, especially
in his earnest confidence in the natural justice and perpetuation of what
was once known as "the sexual revolution." There is a degree of charm in
this, reminiscent of the effect a mildly rakish figure of the Regency might
have offered in the serious England of the 1860's. The notion that what
Brundage refers to as "recreational sex" or prostitution are joyful distrac-
tions (or at worst what used to be called "victimless crimes") exemplifies a
certain laisser-aller when it comes to issues of exploitation, typification of
gender, or social hegemony. Brundage is entitled to ignore current pieties,
but his approach, anachronistic yet not quite up-to-date, influences the
depiction of the past and stands in the way of understanding his own
impressively marshalled evidence.
The "pastness" of the past, and its integrity, are diminished by examin-
ing it as a benighted collection of false assumptions, measured by the in-
struments of a supposedly objective modernity. Apart from the uncertainty
surrounding the true nature of the contemporary opinions, this practice
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creates a distorted and uneasy vision. It is not just the peculiar juxtaposi-
tions, such as references to the canonists' preference for "the missionary
position," or a table of sexual decision-making according to the Irish
penitentials which is entitled "Feeling Randy?" (p. 162). More questiona-
ble is the use of the modern belief that sexuality is a form of human
expression to judge the canonists of the Middle Ages. The canon lawyers
held ideas and assumptions about what were natural or licit sexual acts,
but they did not regard sexuality in the quasi-therapeutic sense of psycho-
logical self-fulfillment that has held the stage in recent decades. Their
desire for social control stemmed from something more than mere repres-
siveness of the sort often identified with the nineteenth century-from
ideas concerning the flesh, sin, and social purpose.
Behind medieval legal discussions there lies a theology of the human
body and a form of religious longing somewhat more alien than Brundage
allows. Recent studies by Peter Brown and Elaine Pagels of late Anti-
quity and Caroline Bynum of the late Middle Ages reveal concepts of the
body that are both more profound and more tormented than the prim,
sanctimonious disapproval depicted by Brundage.' In a characteristically
strange but telling metaphor, Peter Brown once likened the attitude of the
Roman sage toward the stirrings of the flesh to the sounds of plumbing in
a neighbor's apartment-noticeable but irrelevant.' On the other hand, for
Christians of the Roman Empire and throughout the Middle Ages as
well, the promptings of desire occurred in a more dramatic setting, within
a body both corrupt and yet capable of physical sanctification beyond
mere judicious restraint. Sexual longing was dangerous, searing, not sim-
ply irritating; virginity and marriage were regarded as aspects of a sacred
order, not simply as bulwarks against licentiousness. That continence and
self-mortification should be esteemed may be difficult now to admire, but
for long centuries such ideas suffused more than merely learned opinion.
The belief that physical suffering may be a way of approaching God, that
the body, which will after all be resurrected, must be purified, is particu-
larly hard for our age to share. Without some tacit acceptance of how
such an opinion might prevail, however, the medieval period remains
opaque and grotesque.
Although the unremarkable theme of this book is that the medieval
church did not approve of human sexual instincts except in a carefully
circumscribed manner, such a consistency of outlook is belied, or at least
made more confusing, by a number of controversies within the "repres-
2. Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christi-
anity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent
(New York: Random House, 1988); Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Reli-
gious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
3. Peter Brown, "The Philosopher and the Monk: Two Late Antique Options," a talk given at
Columbia University, February 11, 1987.
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sive" tradition. Is marriage a sacrament? Under what circumstances may
it be dissolved? May the clergy marry? To understand how such basic
issues could persist within a universally applicable body of law requires
consideration of the sources of authority for canon law and the interpre-
tive strategies of ecclesiastical jurists. What follows is an effort to under-
score and suggest some of the implications of Brundage's meticulous re-
search. This involves sketching the development of legal collections and
enforcement apparatus within the church during the crucial period of the
high Middle Ages, the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. In order to
understand the medieval approach to regulating sexuality, it is necessary
to appreciate the era's methods of scholarship and ways of establishing
law.
Canon law in the Middle Ages showed a movement toward concentra-
tion of authority within the papacy to define and administer the law. At
the same time, in a fashion shared with theological study, there developed
a flourishing critical scholarship that subjected texts to a painstaking exe-
gesis. The quintessence of the canonistic mentality may be represented by
the careful commentaries of Pope Innocent IV (Sinobaldo de'Fieschi) on
papal decretals, including his own rulings. In this instance the pope acted
as both creator of authoritative decisions and interpreter of those decisions,
revealing their further implications. By this time, the mid-thirteenth cen-
tury, the exercise of papal power was preponderant over other sources of
law. The pope had immense power to offer dispensation from normal ex-
pectations in individual cases and some ability to create new laws.
The growth of this centralized power of legal definition was concen-
trated in the most fruitful age of canonistic study, the late twelfth and
early thirteenth centuries. Earlier compilations, such as those of Burchard
of Worms and Ivo of Chartres, had relied on the collected precepts of the
Bible, the writings of the Church Fathers, the decrees of ecclesiastical
councils both ecumenical and provincial, and even certain secular laws.
Papal letters ruling on litigation or prescribing conduct were acknowl-
edged to possess legal force, and a large amount of purportedly early pa-
pal correspondence was absorbed through the Carolingian-era forgeries,
notably the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. Papal letters were one legal
source among many in Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140) as well. Gratian at-
tempted systematically to assemble seemingly contradictory authorities and
to show how they might be reconciled through logical discrimination.
Gratian's title for his book was the Concordance of Discordant Canons
and the reconciliation of apparent contradictions lay at the heart of the
canonistic agenda during the classic age. In Gratian an essentially con-
servative understanding of law as the product of tradition co-existed with
the typical twelfth-century confidence that reason could shape and clarify
the wisdom of the past without excessively constraining it.
After Gratian, however, interpretive authority came to reside in a dia-
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logue between the rulings of the Roman curia and the scholarship of the
law faculties of European universities, especially Bologna. Between 1140
and 1234, canonists simultaneously pursued the elucidation of the
Decretum and the organizing of papal letter collections. The effectiveness
of the earlier variegated sources of law tended to yield before the papal
power to define, promulgate, and override. Precedent gave way, as it
were, to statute.
Because this was the church and not a secular institution, however, the
enduring prestige of tradition was able to limit the effective imposition of
power, even the sacred power of the pope whom Innocent III described as
the Vicar of Christ and the executive of divine power.4 To be sure, it was
possible for long-established practice to be visibly changed. The Fourth
Lateran Council in 1215 reduced the prohibited degrees of consanguinity
to four from seven thus allowing marriage between those who were not
third cousins or closer. This was acknowledged as a reform of a venerable
but inconvenient practice. Yet the pope could not completely alter the
law's rigors, although he possessed the power to waive its application in
individual instances. The weight of perceived tradition was lessened but
not eliminated by the political centralization in Rome and the rise of a
new hermeneutic in Bologna.
The growth of canon law as a systematic science in some measure cate-
gorized licit and illicit forms of sexual behavior and defined the bonds of
marriage. The church achieved preeminence over secular jurisdictions in
regulating these matters. Impressive as the intellectual and jurisdictional
edifice was, the force of tradition and the plurality of historical precedent
limited the coercive power of the church and turned it in often unexpected
directions. In particular, the analytical logic of distinction (the classifica-
tion of sexual offenses or of licit marriages) affected the European
monarchs, aristocracy, and personnel of the church itself more than it did
the lower orders of society. What emerges from Brundage's treatment of
the laws governing sexuality (more by implication than by direct state-
ment) is a paradox of social control exerted on the strongest and least
acquiescent members of medieval society.
The shaping of canonistic doctrine concerning marriage was especially
challenging to the aristocracy in the context of its obsessions with lineage
and property. As Georges Duby has shown, noble families desired not
merely genealogical continuity but the preservation of hereditary property
from excessive division.5 In a society in which women could transmit
4. "He [the pope] does not exercise the office of man, but of the true God on earth." On Innocent
III and divine authority, see Kenneth Pennington, Pope and Bishops: The Papal Monarchy in the
Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 13-42,
especially p. 16.
5. Georges Duby, Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth-Century France, trans. Elborg
Forster (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); idem, The Knight, the Lady and the
Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France, trans. Barbara Bray (New York:
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property but in which kinship on the male side (agnatic kinship) domi-
nated, the interest of the comfortable classes lay in marrying within the
extended family (endogamy). It also required making sure that parents
controlled their children's choice of marriage partner, and that wives who
seemed incapable of bearing male children be easily cast off. The medieval
church defined and enforced rules against consanguinity that made mar-
riage even of distant cousins impossible unless dispensation were granted.
The ecclesiastical doctrine of marriage as dependent on consent alone, in
place by the thirteenth century, made elopement and clandestine mar-
riages possible, foregoing witnesses, clergy, or parental permission. Fi-
nally, the church tended to limit the ability of couples to separate and
remarry to a very few possibilities (coercion of consent, previous valid
marriage, consanguinity, inability to consummate a marriage).
The canon law of marriage crystallized in a fashion that constrained
the family preservation practices and desires of the upper classes. Even
where the movement in legal opinion seemed to favor relaxation (as in the
reduction of the degrees of prohibited consanguinity), the result was to
shrink loopholes such as the disingenuous "discovery" of consanguinity
after marriage that had previously made possible a nullification petition.
The unsuccessful effort of England's Henry VIII to divorce his first queen
is merely a late and well-known example of the struggles occasioned by
the position of the church regarding divorce and the limited effectiveness
of consanguinity as a lever to achieve dissolution.
Even more antithetical to the outlook of the privileged orders was the
complicated matter of what was considered a valid, indissoluble marriage.
The increasing emphasis given to the consent of the parties weakened the
force of the conventional assumption that parental consent and public cer-
emony were necessary, as well as modifying the common belief that con-
summation and cohabitation created a presumption of marriage. The ex-
change of vows between a couple might be either immediately conclusive,
such as when they stated to each other that they were now married, or a
promise for the future. Present consent, or future consent followed by in-
tercourse, were held to establish an effective marital bond by canonists
writing after the era of Gratian. A famous example of a clandestine and
inappropriate marriage withstanding parental opposition appears in the
fifteenth-century Paston correspondence. The marriage of Margery Pas-
ton to the family's bailiff Richard Calle took place without clergy or wit-
nesses. The bishop of Norwich, an ally of the Pastons, attempted to dis-
cover some procedural flaw when he interrogated the couple, but he was
compelled to adjudge the marriage valid because Margery and Richard
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clandestine nature of the ceremony and the powerful influence of the elder
Pastons, the misalliance stood."
How is one to explain the elaboration of doctrines so opposed to the
interests of the powerful? This question is among the most interesting
implicit in Law, Sex, and Christian Society, but the answer can only be
touched upon in the context of this review. The church, to be sure, was
not all-powerful in compelling the obedience of the laity. Certain practices
such as concubinage survived despite ecclesiastical censure, and one would
certainly not wish to argue that sexual adventures beyond the small com-
pass permitted by ecclesiastical norms were in any sense rare. The church
was, nonetheless, fairly successful in compelling compliance to its court
judgments and in imposing its interpretation of the rules governing licit
sexual relations that involved the potential transmittal of property. Thus
while it is easy to doubt the effectiveness of church sanctions against forni-
cation, it is clear that where marriage was concerned, those who were so
established in the social hierarchy as to desire public acceptance of marital
alliances and separations were required to accept church jurisdiction.
The systemizing of law and the ability of the papacy to define and
enforce it was in large measure the result of the eleventh-century reform
movement that freed the church from local secular powers, increased pa-
pal centralization at the expense of independent episcopal authority, and
battled the custom of clerical marriage. Brundage considers the reform
movement as more important in the rise of sexual regulation than any
supposed attempt to limit lay property concentration and increase church
lands (a view identified especially with Jack Goody).'
If the challenge to the norms of lay society mounted by the church did
not stem from competition for land, how did it arise? Here, I think, we
have to take seriously the desire for intellectual consistency on the part of
both lawyers and theologians of the eleventh to fourteenth centuries. The
church was less acquiescent than it had been in the past to the casual
dissolution of marriage bonds, while becoming increasingly relaxed about
how marriage was accomplished. This outlook followed from the develop-
ment of a definition of marriage as sacramental, and an emphasis on in-
tent and consent. The enforcement of celibacy among the higher clergy
also tended to identify marriage as the worthy and expected attribute of
lay society. A consequence of the increasing separation between clerical
and lay condition was to apply the historic ecclesiastical preference for
complete sexual restraint more narrowly, focusing it on the clergy.
At the same time, the church, after the Gregorian Reform, undertook a
more sustained intervention in the conduct of secular life. This included
6. John Warrington, ed., The Paston Letters, 2 vols. in 1 (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1975), 2:65-
69, 76-78. Brundage mentions this case on p. 500.
7. Goody's views are discussed by Brundage in a brief appendix, pp. 606-607.
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the regularization of confession, the foundation of military orders (knights
living in common according to vows), affiliation of lay men and women
with religious orders, and expansion of a bureaucracy of courts and in-
quisitorial tribunals. Without becoming a condition of personal expecta-
tion in the modern sense, marriage in the high Middle Ages became iden-
tified with a virtuous fulfillment of lay status. The resistance encountered
by married devout women such as Margery Kempe when they sought to
dissolve their marital obligations in favor of celibacy and lead a life dedi-
cated to religious devotion demonstrates a complexity in the mental and
social ordering of society.8
In all these developments it is possible to see the church as a hectoring,
interfering authority. Certainly the debates of decretists (p. 378) on
whether or not a man who was allowed to dissolve his first marriage be-
cause of impotence but proved able to consummate a second marriage
should return to his first wife (and then what if he remains incapable of
sexual intercourse with his first wife?) seem to trespass outlandishly onto
what is now considered personal, confessional, or therapeutic terrain. Yet
one should not measure the past with the deceptive tools of an arbitrary
idea of what is "naturally" healthy, psychologically balanced, or private.
The Middle Ages, as Brundage points out in his conclusion, offer certain
lessons on sexual regulation. These lessons, however, are not to be read
simply as a cautionary tale against repression; rather they can be better
understood as describing the variety of consequences following assump-
tions of the meaning of human embodiment.
The canonists were of a speculative but essentially practical turn of
mind-lawyers, not philosophers. They did not engage in introspective
evaluations of sexual temptation or the condition of the soul but were
concerned rather with regulating social relations and ecclesiastical admin-
istration and preserving logical consistency. Nevertheless, they too oper-
ated in a partially examined context of dual condemnation and sanctifica-
tion of the body, with all its instincts and power. Seeming anomalies, such
as the canonists' insistence on the right of both husband and wife to re-
ceive sexual gratification upon demand, even if rendered at illicit times
(the "marital debt"), become not just legal peculiarities but the exemplifi-
cation of a series of assumptions concerning the human condition, in par-
ticular a backhanded acknowledgement of natural sexual desire. Brundage
offers a thorough and authoritative guide to canonistic opinion, but the
implications of the laws of sexual conduct for understanding the Middle
Ages remain to be explored.
8. B. A. Windeatt, trans., The Book of Margery Kempe, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985).
[Vol. 1: 353
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol1/iss2/5
